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AB STRACT
We examine abnormal stock returns surrounding contemporaneous
earnings and dividend announcements in order to determine whether
investors evaluate the two announcements in relation to each other.
We find that there is a statistically significant interaction effect.
The abnormal return corresponding to any earnings or dividend announce-
ment depends upon the value of the other announcement. This evidence
suggests the existence of a corroborative relationship between the two
announcements. Investors give more credence to unanticipated dividend
increases or decreases when earnings are also above or below expecta-
tions, and vice versa.








It seems fair to say that there is today a wide consensus
that either favorable earnings or dividend announcements
can, by themselves, induce positive abnormal stock returns.
The effect of earnings announcements on stock price changes
has been documented by Ball and Brown(1968), Foster (1977),
Brown(1978), Watts(1978), and Rendleman, Jones and Latane
(1982) The dividend announcement effect was first high-
lighted by Pettit(1972, 1976). Although Watts(1973, 1976)
took issue with some of Pettit's methodology, recent studies
by Charest(1980) and Aharony and Swary(1980), which are im-
mune to Watts's reservations, strongly confirm the existence
of an information content of dividend announcements.The
Aharony and Swary study in particular carefully controls for
earnings announcements when measuring the effect of divi-
dends. It uses daily data and measures abnormal returns in
periods surrounding dividend announcements only when that
period does not also contain an earnings announcement. This
procedure avoids the possible confounding of the information
conveyed by the two announcements.Finally, Miller and
Scholes(1982), in a study focused primarily on dividends and
taxes, find significant evidence of a dividend announcement
effect.
These studies have for the most part attempted to measure
the separate effects of either dividends or earnings. In
general, the effect of the other announcement has been
—1—treated as a statistical nuisance which muddles the waters
and introduces methodological complications. Consequently,
these studies necessarily leave unanswered the question of
whether investors evaluate dividend and earnings announce-
ments in relation to each other. Earnings figures can be ma-
nipulated by clever accounting practices, and so may be in-
terpreted with skepticism by the investment community
(Kaplan and Roll, 1972). SImIlarly, dividend announcements
are only a crude way to convey information to capital mar-
kets.
While both earnings and dividend data have been shown to
influence stock performance, one would expect that, in view
of the noise associated with either announcement, the capi-
tal market would be interested in the consistency of the
stories told by earnings and dividend announcements. This
might lead to a corroboration effect on stock prices. Empir-
ical evidence of such an interaction effect would be consis-
tent with thehypothesis that the announcements convey use-
ful, hut imperfect information.
Unfortunately, by isolating the separate effects of divi-
dends and earnings announcements, the statistical procedures
utilized in previous studies have precluded the measurement
of a corroboration effect. This effect is the focus of this
study. We select firms for which dividends and earnings an-
nouncements are separated by less than 10 days. The abnormal
return surrounding this tijoint announcement" is measured and
—2—the separate as well as interactive effects of the dividend
and earnings announcements are estimated.
Our empirical results, presented belowin Section 4,
clearly support the hypothesis of an interaction effect be-
tween dividend and earnings announcements. Althoughregres-
sions of cumulative abnormal stock returns on unanticipated
dividends and earnings yield highly significant coefficients
on each variable, once terms that capture the interaction
between the announcements are added to the regression, the
interaction terms are at least as statistically significant
as the level effects. These results indicate that the ef-
fects of earnings and dividend innovations dependupon the
value of the other variable. Each announcement is evaluated
with respect to the information contained in the other.
2. DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION
Our sample consists of 352 observations ofquarterly
earnings and dividend announcements made during the sample
period from the 4th quarter of 1979 to the 2nd quarter of
1981.The selection criteria of these firm—cases are as
follows.
1.Firms are listed in the University of Chicago CRSP
tapes and also in the Standard and Poor's Quraterly
COMPUSTAT Tapes for the 1973 —1981period.
2.Firm's main business line is in manufacturingsec—
tors(SIC codes from 2000 to 3999)
—3—3. Earnings and dividend announcements of these firms
were reported in the Wall Street Journal during the
sample period.
4. The two announcements occurred within 10 days of each
other.
5.Firm's fiscal year ends in March, June, September, or
December.
Nonmanufacturing industries were excluded from the sample
because they tend to contain many regulated firms whose div-
idend decisions might be constrained. In order to obtain a
sample which was roughly balanced with regard to the compo-
sition of positive, zero, and negative earnings and dividend
surprises, we utilized the following procedures: First, all
firms satisfying requirements 1 —5above were sampled from
the fourth quarter of 1979 and the second quarter of 1981.
This resulted in a sample of 256 observations, which was
dominated by cases with zero change in quarterly dividends.
(188 of the 256 observations had zero dividend change.) We
next scanned the COMPUSTAT tape for all fiscal quarters be-
tween 1980:1 and 1981:1 to identify all eligible firms which
had a dividend increase or decrease of at least five cents
per share.(Firms with extra dividends were excluded from
the sample.) This procedure resulted in an additional 96 ob-
servations, although only 22 of these were dividend decreas-
es. The final composition of the sample with respect to the
sign of dividend and earnings surprises is presented in Ta-
ble 1.
—4—TABLE 1
Classification of Data+-+ -+-+
IEarningsSurprise I
+ + + + +
I I positivenegative Itotall
+ + + + + +
I Dividend Ipositive I 78 I 61 I139 I
-4 - + + + +
ISurprise Izero I 85 I 103 188 I
-4 I- + + + +
I negative 4 21 25 I
+ + + + + +
I total 185 167 352 I
+ + + + + +
Notes: Definitions of expected dividend and earnings
are given in equations (1) and (2), respec-
tively.
The selection of announcements which are closely timed
improves the chances of statistically being able to discern
abnormal returns. To detect a corroboration effect, we need
to measure abnormal returns over a period encompassing both
announcements. If those announcements were widely separated
in time, then the abnormal return would need to be calculat-
ed over a long intermediate period, during which no relevant
event would occur. The extra noise introduced by returns
during that period would make it difficult to identify the
effects of announcement per se.
Daily stock returns for the 352 observations were availa-
ble from the CRSP tapes. Dividends per share and primary
earnings per share excluding extraordinary items and discon-
tinued operations were obtained from the COMPTJSTAT tapes and
—5—both earnings and dividend figures were adjusted for stock
dividends or stock splits.
3. METHODOLOGY
In order to measure unanticipated dividends and earnings,
we need models of expectation formation. Rather than build-
ing our own models of such expectations, we rely on models
whose validity already have been established elsewhere. The
validityof an expectational model will be considered to be
confirmed ifanearlier study has demonstrated a link be-
tweenunanticipated dividend or earnings derived from that
model and subsquent abnormal stock price performance.
3.1DIVIDEND EXPECTATION MODEL
Aharony and Swary(1980) demonstrate that a simple divi-
dend forecasting model could successfully predict abnormal
stock performance. The model forecasts no change in divi-




where Dq equals the ordinary dividend per share in the q th
quarter and the asterisk denotes an expectation operator'.
The model is consistent with the hypothesis that managers
are reluctant to change dividends in either direction unless
they believe the prospects of the firm have significantly
1. Such a model would probably fare poorly with extra divi-
dends, which are explicitly paid on a one—time—only basis.
—6—improved or deteriorated. Laub(1970) found that firms
changed regular dividends in only 25 percent of sampled
quarters. This infrequency of dividend change suggests that
the simple model might capture expectations to a firstap—
proximat ion.
Aharony and Swary report that this model was as success-
ful as the more sophisticated one of Fama and Babiak(1968)
in predicting abnorm-l performance. The model is ultimately
validated by the strong evidence that stock performance was
above normal following positive dividend innovations and be-
low normal for negative innovations. Our measure of unanti-
cipated dividends, denoted by DU, is therefore computed as
the percentage change in dividends from the previousquar-
ter:
U * D =DID— 1=DID — 1
qq q q q—1
3.2EARNINGS EXPECTATION MODEL
The time series properties of quarterly earnings data
have been extensively studied. Benston and Watts(1978) exam-
ine several Box—Jenkins(197O) models and find that a speci-
fication used by Foster(1977) has the best predictivepower
and that the forecast errors of the Foster model are most
closely related to abnormal stock market returns. Watts
(1978) corroborates the ability of forecast errors from the
Foster model to predict abnormal stock returns. Therefore we
will use this model to generate earnings expectations:
—7—Eq =Eq_4+ a + b(Eq_1 —Eq5) (2)
where subscripts q denote quarters. The earnings model al-
lows for seasonal dependence in earnings, for trend growth
(via a) and for business cycle effects (viaEq._1 —Eq_5)
We
fit equation (2) separately for each firm in the sample to
generate a one period ahead earnings forecast for each firm
and took as our measure of unanticipated earnings, EU, the
percentage error in the earnings forecast:
EU =F/E —1
q q q
3.3MEASUREMENT OF ABNORMAL STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE
Abnormal returns are calculated over a period beginning
10 days prior to the first announcement of dividends or
earnings and ending 10 days subsequent to the second an-





AR. =theabnormal return in day t for firm j,
totalreturn in day t for firm j,
Rt
=marketreturn in day t,
Rft =Treasurybill rate in day t,
B. =betafor stock of firm j.The beta is computed from a market model regressionusing
one year of weekly data prior to the first announcement. We
use the CAPM to measure abnormal returns rather than the
market model, because the intercept of the market model is
an ex post result which cannot be taken as a predictor for
future periods. A firm with above expected returns in one
period should not necessarily be expected to generate su-
perior returns in following periods. Use of the ex post in-
tercept would impose this expectation on returns for future
periods.
For each firm in the sample, indexed by j, cumulative ab-
normal returns (CAR) are calculated as
T .+1O
CAR. = ARt (3)
t=T .—1O
1J
where T1. is the date of the first announcement andT2 is
the date of the latter announcement for firm j.2
In theory, The CAR over the joint announcement period
should not depend on the announcement order. The new infor-
mation released to the market after both announcements are
2. Some authors have found a tendency for abnormal returns
to persist for long periods after the earnings announcement.
However, even in these studies, the bulk of the CAR occurs
within a few days surrounding the announcement. For exam-
ple, in Rendleman, Jones, and Latane(1982) more than two
thirds of the CAR typically appeared within the 20 days sur-
rounding the earnings announcement. Aharony and Swary(1980),
and Divecha and Morse(1983) report that the effect of divi-
dend announcement is generally completely impounded into
stock prices within 20 day period surrounding the announce-
ment.
—9—made is identical, regardless of their order. Therefore the
total abnormal return should be identical over the period
containing both announcements. For example, consider a large
positive earnings innovation followed by a small dividend
innovation. The first announcement would likely generate a
large return, while the second could conceivably generate a
negative abnormal return because conditional on the first
announcement the dividend innovation is disappointing.If
the announcements were reversed, the dividend innovation
would generate a small positive return and the large earn-
ings innovation would generate a small positive abnormal re-
turn because conditional on the earlier (small) dividend in-
novation, earnings are above expectation. The total effect
of the two announcements in either order should be identi-
cal, since after both announcements are released, the new
information available to the market is identical. We test
this hypothesis below, and find that the ordering of the an-
nouncements seems irrelevant to the CAR over the announce-
ment period. The appendix provides a more rigorous demon-
stration that announcement order should not affect our
emp irical results.
—10—3.4SPECIFICATION
Rendleman, Jones, and Latane(1982) argue that it is ap-
propriate to standardize unexpected earnings by the standard
error of forecasts. This argument is appealing if investors
react less strongly to earnings or dividend innovations when
the typical variability of such innovations is large. Even
if large innovations are observed, these might be discounted
if the standard errors of the forecasts are also large. This
procedure thus rests on the statistical inference problem
facing market participants.
One potential weakness of this approach Is that the stan-
dardization disturbs the interpretation of innovations in
terms of economic magnitudes. A small earnings Innovation
should not cause a large change in stock price, even if it
is statistically significant. Rather than choose one or the
other of these specifications, we present results below us-
ing standardized and nonstandardized values for EU, DU, and
CAR.
To standardize the earnings and dividend series, we cal-
culated the time series of DU and EU using one quarter
q q
ahead forecast errors over the period 1973:3 to two quarters
prior to the announcement quarter. We then calculated the






11—where SE and SD are the standard deviations of earnings and
dividend forecast errors, respectively.
To standardize CAR we first calculated S. (where j de-
notes firms) as the standard deviation of the daily residual
obtained by applying the CAPM to the 90 tradings days of
data which end 30 trading days before the first announce-




where the CT2. —T1.+ 21) term equals the number of days
starting from 10 days before the first announcement and end-
ing 10 days after the second announcement, i.e., the days
over which the CAR is calculated.
We test our hypothesis regarding the importance of inter-
actions between earnings and dividend announcements using
two set of regressions. The first set is in the spirit of
Pettit(1972) who combines stocks into positive and negative
earnings surprise groups and then compares the abnormal
stock performances for each sub—class of dividend surprises
within each earnings group. This is a nonparametric test in
the sense that only the signs of the announcement surprises
are used in forming the portfolios. His procedure is roughly
equivalent to regressing abnormal returns on dummy variables
which take values of zero or one depending on the signs of
the forecast errors.
—12—Our first set of regressions takes the form,
CAR =
b0+ b1DU + d2EU + b3D(—O)
+ b4D(—+) + b5D(+—) + b6D(+O) + b7D(-H-) (4)
where D(+—) is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if the
earnings innovation is positive and dividend innovation is
negative and 0 otherwise, and where the other dummy vari-
ables are defined analogously.Since the D(——) variable
must be excluded for reasons of collinearity of the six pos-
sible dummies with the intercept, the base case has the in-
terpretation of a negative innovation in both earnings and
dividends and the intercept is thus expected to be negative
if interaction effects are relevant.
Equation (4) is equivalent to an analysis of variance
with two covariates, UandEu. It thus implicitly has a
grouping procedure at its foundation and so is sitniliar to
the approach in 2ettit. Under the hypothesis that interac-
tions are unimportant, the dummy variables should be jointly
insignificant. The intercept b0 would be zero, and the slope
coefficients, b1 and b2 should capture the entire effect of
dividend and earnings announcements. The effects of the two
announcements would then simply be additive.
Conversely, if announcements are corroborative, then the
grouping procedure represented by the dummy variables will
be important, and the coefficients of the dummies will be
—13—significant. In this case, the coefficients b1 and b2 still
might be positive since the dummies cannot capture the mag-
nitude of any announcements, but their significance levels
should be lowered.
Our second specification is more parametric in nature. We
first create interaction terms of the form,
INT(—+) =(IDUx EI1'2 + 1.0) x D(—+)
where an analogous interaction term is created for each of
the six possible combinations of earnings(+ or —)anddivi—
dends(+, 0, or —).
Themotivation for this form of interaction terms is as
follows: the absolute value of the product of Du and EU
gives the magnitude of the interaction. Large values corre-
spond to strongly corroborative or strongly contradictory
signals, depending upon the agreement of the signs of the
two surprises. The square root operation is performed to
maintain dimensional consistency. That operation gives the
interaction term a unit of percent error which is the unit
of the other right hand side variables. The value 1.0 is
added to the term IDE' x EUP because of the problems which
would arise when DU =0.In that case, the interaction term
for DU =0and any earnings level would be identically zero
and a slope coefficient could not be estimated. The addition
of 1.0 to the term causes the interaction variable for these
—14—cases to be a simple dummy variable which takes a value of
1.0 in the relevant instance and zero otherwise.Thus the
Interaction term is a quantitative variable for DU0, and
a simple dummy variable otherwise. Finally, multiplication
by the dummy variables D(—+), etc., is required to distin-
guish among the possible combinations of zero, positive, and
negative innovations, so as to capture the effect of sign
agreements or disagreements.
To summarize, the second specification takes the form,
CAR =
b0+ b1Eu + b2Du
+ b3INT(——) + b4INT(—O) + b5INT(—+)
+ b6INT(+—) + b7INT(+O) + b8INT(++) (5)
Notice that in this specification all six possible combina-
tions of interaction terms can be included since the inter-
action terms are no longer collinear with the constant term.
We will present estimates of equations (4) and (5) for
four specifications corresponding to the possible permuta-
tions of standardization of the dependent and independent
variables. One potential problem relating to those specifi-
cations with non—standardized dependent variables is the
possibility of heteroskedasticity. This might arise since
the CAR for each observation differs according to the time
interval between announcements and the standard deviation of
daily residuals, s• We tested our specifications for heter—
—15—oskedasticity using the procedure suggested by White (1980).
These specifications showed virtually no evidence of heter—
oskedasticity; the chi—square statistics obtained in all
cases were less than one—half the critical value correspond-
ing to a 5 percent confidence level. We checked further for
heteroskedasticity by performing weighted least squares re-
gressions with weights equal to the reciprocal of either
(T9. —T1.+ 21)1/2 or s.(T7. —T1+21)1/2.The residuals
from these WLS regressions were then subjected to the White
test; the results uniformly indicated that the unweighted
residuals were closer to being homoskedastic. In no cases
were the coefficient values significantly affected by the
weighting scheme. For these reasons, we present results only
for the simple OLS regressions. Finally, we also experiment-
ed with specifications which included the squared values of
EU and Du in the list of independent variables. The inclu-
sion of these varibles seemed to have little effect on the
coefficients of the other variables. The heteroskedasticity
tests for these specifications also were similar to those
for the regressions without the square terms. In light of
the similiarity of these results with those presented above,
in the interest of brevity, we do not present the results
for the expanded specifications.
—16—4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1CORROBORATIVE EFFECTS
Table 2 presents regressions in the spirit of traditional
studies, which ignores possible interactions between earn-
ings and dividend announcements. The four columns of the ta-
ble correspond to different combinations of the standardiza-
tion of the right hand side and left hand side variables.
The table confirms that our sample produces results similar
to those reported in the literature. The coefficients of
both the earnings and dividend announcements are uniformly
positive and significant at better than the one percent lev-
el, regardless of the standardization of the regression
variables.
These results suggest that earnings or dividend surprises
can, by themselves, induce abnormal stock returns. In col-
umn 1 of Table 2, for which neither CAR nor innovations are
standardized, al percent surprise in earnings or dividends
leads to a 0.034 or 0.07 percent abnormal return,respec-
tively. The other regressions do not have simple economic
interpretations due to the effect of standardization, but
the qualitative properties of the regressions are similar.
Table 3 presents estimates of equation (4), which in-
cludes Er', Du and qualitative dummy variables to capture in-
teraction effects. The D(— —)dummy(negative surprises in
earnings and dividends) is suppressed so that the base case
—17—TABLE 2
Regression Results without Interaction Terms
+ +
dependentICAR ICARS
'variablel (not standardized)I (CAR standardized)
+ +
• U U U U independt.I E, D E ,D
I I + I +
Ivariables Inotstd. Istd. not std. std. I
I + + + +
I Constant I—.005 —.011 —.015 I—.088 I
I l( 1.12)I(2.31**)I(.26 )I( 1.44)I
+
I Earnings .034 .016 .435 I.233 I
I SurpriseI(4,51**)l(4.40**fl( 4.34**)l(4.81**)l
I + + + +
I Dividend .070 I.015 I.709 .177
ISurprisel(4.16**)I(4.87**)I( 3.18**)I( 4.30**)l
+ + + +
IR2 I I I I I
(adjusted)I .124 .135 I.096 I.127 I
I + + + +
Notes:1.t—statistics in parentheses
2. *(**) denotes coefficients significantly
different from zero at 5%(1%) level.
3. 'std.' represents 'standardized'.
(represented by the intercept) has the interpretation of a
bad news scenario: Eu < 0, D' < 0.The coefficents of the
dummy variables thus represent the incremental return over
the (——) caseresulting from placement in another group.
These coefficients are all positive and generally highly
significant, regardless of standardization. For the most
part the magnitudes of the coefficients increase as one
moves down the table from D(— 0) to D(+ +),whichreflects
the increasing "good—news nature" of the announcements. The
only exception to this rule surrounds the transition from
—18—TABLE 3
Regression Results with Interaction Dummies
+ +
dependent! CAR ICARS
'variable! (not standardized)I (CAR standardized)
+ +
• u u u u independt. E D E , D
variablesI +
Inotstd. Istd.not std. Istd.
+ + +
ConstantI—.083 —.081 I—.958 —.779
f(3.47**fl(3.41**)!(3.06**)I( 2.50**)
+ + + +
Earnings I .015 I .009 I .213 I .173
Surprise I( 1.55 )I (1.89)I ( 1 •64) ( 2. 68**)
+ + + +
Dividend I .029 .008 I .150 .097
Surprise( 1.24) I ( 1.35 )(.50 ) I (1•24 )
+ + + +
D(— 0) I.068 I.069 I.828 I.703
I(2,84**)I(2.80**)I( 1.64 )I(2.20*)
+ + + +
D(— +) .079 I .072
I .969 I.725 ( 2.84**) I(2.28**) I( 2.65**) (1•71)
+ + + +
D(+ —) .057 I.054 I.772 I .623
(1.22)I(1.18)I(1.25)f(1.03)
+ + + +
D(+ 0) .092 I.089 I1.044 I.811
I(3.38**)I(3.32**)I(2.93**)I(2.33*)
+ + + +
D(++) I.103 I.089 I1.320 I.911
I(3.48**)I(2.59**)I( 3.41**)I(2.03*)
+ + + +
F—stat. I
I
list order 2.08 I2.79 I .61 449*
+ + + +
F—stat.
I interact. 2.65* 2.37*
I2.46* I1.21
+ + + +
R2 I I
(adjusted)I .144 .147 I.115 I.130
+ + + +
Notes:1. t—statistics in parentheses
2. *(**) denotes coefficient significantly
different from zero at 5%(1%) level.
• U 3.D(—+) denotes a dummy with value 1 if E <0
and DU>0. The other dummies are defined
analogously.
—19—(— +)to (+ —),whichis the only pair of events which can-
not be naturally ordered. The coefficients of the (+ 0) and
(+ +) dummies all exceed the intercept, which reflects the
unambiguous good news of those scenarios, while the coeffi—
cent of the (—0)dummy is of less magnitude than the inter-
cept. The coefficients of the (+ —)and(—+)dummies are,
in 7 out of 8 cases, of lower magnitude than the intercept,
which indicates that a negative surprise in either dividends
or earnings seems to be sufficient to induce negative stock
performance.
The coefficients on the magnitudes of Eu and D" are still
positive, as one would expect, However, when the dummies are
included, the size of the coefficents falls by a factor of
approximately 2 relative to Table 2, and the coefficients
generally lose statistical significance. This pattern is
consistent with the hypothesis that the earnings and divi-
dend announcements are interpreted jointly so that the in-
teraction dummies are the key explanatory variables.
The acid test of the corroboration hypothesis is given by
the F—statistics reported for each regression in Table 3.
The first order F—statistic tests the joint significance of
DU and EU taken together. The interaction F—statistic tests
the joint significance of the right hand side dummy vari-
ables.All the F—statistics are computed using sums of
squared residuals from constrained and unconstrained regres-
sions. The degrees of freedom for the first order statistics
—20—are (2,344) and for the interaction statistics (5,344); the
corresponding critical values for a 5 percent confidence
level are 3.02 and 2.24. A significant value for the inter-
action F—statistics is consistent with the corroboration hy—
pothes is.
The F—statistics presented in Table 3 are generally sup-
portive of the corroboration hypothesis. The interaction
dummy variables are jointly significant at a 5 percent level
in three of the four specifications. In contrast, the earn-
ings and dividend surprise variables are jointly significant
only in the fourth specification.The interaction terms
seem to be better able to explain abnormal stock performance
than the levels of Eu and Du. This evidence suggests that
the two announcements are not evaluated in isolation.
Table 4 presents regressions based on quantitative inter-
action terms. Although the results of these regressions are
not as strong as in Table 3, they also tend to support the
corroboration hypothesis.
The F—statistics for the significance of the interaction
term is significant in two of four cases, while that for the
first order effects of the announcements is never signifi-
cant. The lower significance level may be due to misspecifi—
cation of the exact functional form for the interaction
terms, or may be due to increased collinearity between the
interaction and first order effects when both are specified
quantitatively.
—21—TABLE 4
Regression Results with Quantitative Interactions
I + + + +
IdependentICAR ICARS ICAR CARS
'variable Inotstd. Istd. not std. Istd.
I' + + + +
U U U U indep. E D E D
Ivariables I(not standardized) (standardized)
I + + + +
I Constant .049 .250
I—.012 I—.316
I(1.09)I(.42)I( .64 )I( 1.24 )
I + + + +
Earnings .010 j.145 .007 I.147
ISurprise (1.00 )I ( 1.07 )( 1.27 )( 1•95*)
+ + + +
IDividend I.013 —.031 —.001 .018
ISurprise I(.49 )C.09) I (.09) I (.20 )
I + + + +
INT(——) —.086 —.809 —.032 I—.231
I C 3.17**) (2.25*)( 2.57k ) C 1.40 )
I + + + +
IINT(—0) I—.065 —.400 —.002 .222
l( 1.43 )I(.66)I(.07)I(.79 )
I + + + +
IINT(— +) I—.046 —.211 .009 I.197
I(1.10 )I(.38)I( .78 )I(1.29 )
I + + + +
IINT(+ —) —.065 —.404 I—.028 —.109
I( 1.72)I(.81)I(1.55 )I( .46 )
+ + +- +
INT(+0) I—.039 I—.137 I .022 .368
I(.83)I(.22)I(.99 )I(1.29)
+ + + +
INT(++) I—.018 .167 I.019 .305
I(.47)I(.32)l( 1.84 )I(2.23*)
I + + + +
F—stat. I I I listorder I.60 I.49 .83 1.90
+ + + +
F—stat. I I Iinteract. I1.18 I2.61* I2.67* I1.79
+ + + +
R I I I I
(adjusted)I .159 I.121 .155 I.135
I + + + + I
Notes: 1. t—statistics in parentheses.
2. *(**) denotes significantly different from
zero at 5%(1%) level.
3. INT(—+) denotes the interaction term when
EU<0 and DU>0. Other interaction terms are
defined analogously.
—22—The quantitative properties of the Table 4 regressions
are similar to those of Table 3. The coefficients of the
earnings and dividend surprise variables are insignificant
in the presence of the interaction terms. tn fact, in col-
umns 2 and 3, the dividend surprise coefficients are neg-
ative, although the t—statistics are virtually zero. The
coefficients of the interaction terms increase as the an-
nouncements become more favorable.
The major problem with this specification appears in pan-
el 1 of Table 4, in which the coefficients of all the inter-
action terms are negative. Although the coefficients bear
the expected relative relations to each other in the sense
that their algebraic valus increase for better—news scenar-
ios, the coefficients of the (+ 0) and (+ +) terms clearly
should be positive. When we reran the regression constrain-
ing the intercept to be zero (which imposes zero predicted
CAR for zero surprises in both announcements) the problem
was "cured." The constrained regression result was:
CAR =•O1OEU+.OO6Du —.O61INT(——) —.O16INT(—O) —.OO2INT(—+)
—.0371NT(+—)+.011INT(-I-0) +.0231NT(++)
R2(adjusted) =.157,F 9.17**, sample =352
The coefficients on the six interaction terms ranged from
—0.061 on the (——) termto +0.023 on the (+ +) term; both
of these coefficients were significant at the 5 percent lev-
el and the intermediate coefficients bore the expected rela—
—23—tionships to each other. However, the results of the uncon-
strained regressions remain puzzling.
4.2DOES THE ANNOUNCEMENT ORDER MATTER?
We suggested that the order of two announcements should
not matter. The CAR measured is the total effect on stock
prices of the new information contained in the two announce-
ments. The order of the two announcements should matter only
If the announcement order per se contains information.
To test this proposition we ran an extended set of re-
gressions with terms designed to capture any ordering ef-
fect. We first define the terms,
ELEAD =[i
if tD > tE
Ootherwise
ELAG = 1if tE > tD
O otherwise
where tE and tD are the dates of the earnings and dividend
announcements and where analogous terms are defined for the
dividend terms DLEAD and DLAG.Both LEAD and LAG dummies
could be included in the regression because announcement
dates were identical for 116 observations.
—24—The coefficient on E" x ELEAD in Table 5 therefore indi-
cates the increase in the first order effect of the earnings
surprise due to its revelation prior to dividends. Table 5
presents estimates of this effect for three specifications:
first order effects alone, first order plus interaction dum-
my terms, and first order plus quantitative dummy terms.
The regression variables in Table 5 are all non—standard-
ized. Results using standardized variables were similar and
are not reported. The results in Table 5 are provocative in
that the coefficients of the ELEAD and DLEAD variables are
positive, while the LAG variables are negative. However, the
t—statistics are all extremely small, centering around a
magnitude of roughly one half. There is no convincing evi-
dence that the order of the two announcements significantly
influence their effects on stock returns.
—25—TABLE 5
Effects of Announcement Order
I + +—--_-----+ +
independt. I CAR I CAR independtI CAR
variables
I Ivariablesi
+ + + +
IConstant —.005 I—.082 Constantl .160
I(1.08)I(3.38**)I I(1.91)
+ + + +
IE" .034 .011 EU .010
j(2.47**)J(.74)I l(.62)
I + + + +
ID' I .072 j .037 DU .020
I ( 2.93**) (1.25)I (.66 )
I + + + + I
EU .006 I .010I EU .007
xELEAD(.35)I(.55 )IxELEADI(.42 )
+ + + +
IEU I.015 —.008 E' I—.ou
ELAGJ(.62)(.32)IxELAGI(.48)I
I + + + +
DU f .033 .009 DU —.007
xDLEADf(.49)I(.13)JxDLEADI( .20 )I
I + + + +
DU I—.010 I—.016 DU
I—.020
xDLAGI(.29)I(.45)IxDLAGIc.30)I






+ + + +
ID(—0) I .067 JINT(—0)1—.175
I ( 2.74**) I C 2.09*)
+ + + + I
D(—+) I I .078 IINT(—+)I .159 I
I I( 2.74**)I (C1.92)I
+ + + + I
D(+—) I I .066 IINT(+—)I—.168 I
I I( 1.34)I Ic 2.14*)(
+ + + + I
D(+0) I I.091 IINT(+0)1.149 I
I IC 3.33**)I ( 1,78)I
+ + + + I
D(+ +) I.102 IINT(++)I—.131 I
IC 3.39**)( I(1.60)I
+ + + + I Notes:1. t—statistics in parentheses.
2.*(**)denotes significantly different from
zeroat 5%(1%) level.
3. Dummy and INT variables are defined in
Tables3 and 4,
—26—5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
We have examined the corroborative relationship between
earnings and dividend announcements. We first demonstrated
that our sample is similiar to those of earlier researchers,
who found that unexpected dividend and earnings announce-
ments appear in and of themselves to be able to induce ab-
normal stock returns. However, once a more general specifi-
cation which allows for interaction effects between the two
announcements was estimated, empirical results indicated
that the announcements are indeed interpreted in relation-
ship to each other.This interaction or corroborative ef-
fect was generally statistically significant. Finally,we
tested for any potential effect of the order of the two an-
nouncements, and as expected, found that the order of the
announcements did not significantly affect the total inagni—
tudes of abnormal returns.
—27—APPENDIX
In this appendix we examine the effect of announcement
order on regression results. For expositional simplicity, we




Although we ignore announcement order in the text, in prac-
tice, the market's expectation of the second announcement is
derived conditional on the first announcement. The issues
are (1) whether the total return over the joint announcement
period will be affected by announcement order and (2) how to
interpret our regression coefficients in light of the condi-
tional expectation formed for the second announcement.
Denote by D'' the unanticipated dividend conditional on
already knowing EU; similarly Euu would be the earnings sur-
prise conditional on knowing DU. To place the model in a re-
gression framework, suppose that E' and DU are joint normal-
ly distributed, so that
EU =kDU+ e
where k is a constant, e is a zero mean normally distributed
error term, and by definition of expectations, the expected
earnings and dividend surprises are zero. The expected value
of E' given Du is simply kDU so that
=e=EU—kDU
—28—and analogously, if earnings are announced first,
uu U U D =D—cE ; c =1/k
By the definition of conditional expectations, 0UU must be
orthogonal to E' and Euu must be orthogonal to Du.
Now consider three regression specifications:
1. CAR =a1E'+ a2D'; if earnings announced first.
2. CAR =b1EUU+ b2DU;if dividend announced first.
3. CAR =d1E'+ d2D'; ignore announcement order.
The first two specifications could in principle be estimated
given a series of surprises and conditional surprises. The
third equation corresponds to the regressions performed in
this paper.
U uu uu u Because of the orthogonality of E to Dand Eto D
the coefficient estimates of (a1, a2) and (b1,b2) will be
identical to those which would be obtained if CAR were re-
gressed against each of the right hand side variables in
specifications 1and 2individually. Therefore, using
Theil's (1971) misspecification theorem for omitted vari-
ables, we can compare regression specifications 2 and 3 to
obta in
b2 =d2+ kb1 (Al)
b1 =d1 (A2)
and compare specifications 1 and 3 to obtain
a1 =d1+ ca2 (A3)
—29—a2 =d2 (A4)
Equation (Al) —(A4)are arithmetic identities which must








Now suppose that if earnings are announced first, speci-













Analogously, suppose earnings announcements lag dividend














In either case. the regression coefficients from the
third specification equal the coefficients on the
al surprise terms from specifications 1 and 2. This result
is consistent with the interpretation of regression coeffi-
cients as partial derivatives. The coefficient on
specification 3 has the interpretation as the incremental
effect of a dividend surprise given the level of the earn-
ings surprise. In specification 1, the dividend variable is
already defined as the dividend surprise given the level of
EU. It is not surprising that the coefficientsare arith-
metically identical.
This analysis highlights the irrelevance of announcement
order. Our regression coefficients capture incremental re-
sults of one announcement for a given value of the other. As
long as order per se contains no information, the marginal
effect of either announcement will be identical given the
value of the other announcement.
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